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ABaWkCT
fhi»

ueleg mm it# fooal text 5t.Thom##

Agmi###' tr##t##mt in »m#k %I #f th# #mmm# Cmmtm# Gmmtilmm.
is «» é'P^p&mmh to th# probiem of th# mnlmn of the int#ileii«'
t##l #mh#t#m## with th# h#dy.
Th# problem# in #h##t, i# that th# proportion r#»
qmirmd h#t*##n matter and form wotild apparently entail a
determination, by th# matter of the body, of the soul'»
reoeptioity of intelligible forma, to the detriwmmt of the
qna#i*imfimite peteney of the intelleet.

On the other hand,

amyeme denying that th# intelleotnai eoel ia the form of the
body muet explain hem the aetiem of nmderatanding ie attrihuted eeaentially to mam.
Am initial emamimetiem of the teaehing# of Arietotle
eeree# to a##a#imt m# with the matmre of the eoml and the
eemeegmemt diffiemltie# involved*

The## diffieoltiea are

hromght into atill eharper feem# in the phileeephy of
Awerree# who, teaohimg that th# imtelleet i# eeperate hat
in ammtimmatie with the body hy the intelligible epeoiee
preaeat ie both the ietelleat am# tb# ecur-fwraal pHantama,
fail# to explain how the aetiem of onderetanding in predioated e##emtially of mam.
Plato, who held that the aoni i# omited to the body
iii
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only a# mover to the moved fails in the sane respect, and,
like Averroes, seems to fell into the error of saying that
man is several beings.
St.Thomas offers a resolution of the problem in
teaching that the subsistent soul, having vegetative,sen
sitive and intellective powers, communicates its esse to
the body which it needs, constitutes a substantial union
with the body through one act of being, and yet surpasses
the matter of the body in its intellective powers whose
exercise needs no corporeal organs.

iv
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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM
This thesis is primarily an exposition of the
Thomistic doctrine concerning the soul's union with the body,
giving insights into the nature of man.
That every sensible being is composed of prime matter
and form, the two combining in a relationship of potency and
act to produce a third, the composite, we know from cosmologi
cal considerations presented in Aristotle's hylomorphic theory.
It is neither the form nor the matter but the reality of the
composite which exists and acts.

Hence, it might appear that

form would be determined according to the nature of the matter
of which it is the act and perfection.

It would seem then,

that the two must be perfectly proportioned to one another, the
form not exceeding the matter in which it has its being.
Remaining on the cosmological level, and applying these prin
ciples, one would conclude that the intellectual soul, the
principle of understanding, could scarcely be the form of the
body.

For, having its being, power, and operation imbedded in

matter, the soul's receptivity of intelligible forms in the
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2.

action of wndorotafiding would bo dot®rmined by the matter of
the body, to the detriment of the qtteei-lnfinite potency of
the intelleot.

On the other hand, anyone denying that the

intelleotnai «oui ie the form of the body, must explain how
the action of understanding ia attributed essentially to man.
This thorn, in the side of philosophers from the time
of flats, was extracted by @t.Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth
century.

That the problem has persisted, as is evidenced by

the philosophies of such as Descartes, is due, perhaps, to a
lack of true appreciation of the Thomietie doctrine.

Such an

appreciation cannot be had without considering the various
treatments given the problem by philosophers prior to St.
fhosaa.

Kis reeolutien of the difficulty, though found in

the Sswto S à S S M S â M #

Sfissteââ»

the

Gousculmm 4m. Anima, is beet presented in the awe-inspiring
complexity of the j a i M SMMSM Gentil## which we shall use as
our focal text.
Our historical considerations of the philosophies of
M a t e , Aristotle, and Averroes will not follow chronological
order.

We will begin with that of Aristotle, for his teach

ings serve to acquaint us with the nature of the soul and
the consequent difficulties involved,

These difficulties are

them brought into sharper focus in the philosophy of Averroes,
whose literal, and possibly erroneous, interpretation of
Aristotle *s dictum that the intellect is "separable, both
impassible and unmixed*, in the light of the quasi-infinite
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potency of the possible intellect, led hi» to deny that the
intellectual soul is the form of the body.

Hence, he seeks

to explain that the action of understanding is attributed to
man because the separate intellect is In continuâtio with the
man by the intelligible species being present in both the
intellect and the corporeal phantasm.
Continuing, we shall briefly consider the doctrine of
Plato on this matter.

For St «Thomas' teachings are closer to

those of Plato than to those of Averroes.

The Angelic Doctor

draws little, if anything, from the latter.

Rather, he seems

to find it to be a corruption of the teachings of Aristotle
and contents himself in the Contra Gentiles, which he wrote
primarily to refute the Arabian philosophers, with pointing
out the absurdities which follow on it.

Although Plato

erred as greatly in attempting to show that man is said to
understand because the immortal (intellectual) soul is united
to him as mover to the moved, St.Thomas finds in this "contact
of power'* a certain validity.

For he notes that "the intellec

tual substance can be united to a body by contact of power",^
and in a following chapter^ refutes arguments posited to show
that a thing one in ratio would not be so constituted.
In the philosophies of Averroes and Plato, we find
involved teachings, directly or indirectly, of the plurality
^ Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles (Taurini:
Marietti, 1938), bk.II, ch. 57.
^ Ibid., ch.,69.
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of forms characteristic of most esmentialist philosophies.
While one might be accused of prematurely crediting this
erroneous position to these philosophers, as well as to
Aristotle, certainly we can find in the philosophies of
Averroes and Plato a similarity of attitude that the intel
lectual soul transcends but does not transfuse the body.
On the other hand, St.Thomas, resolving the problem
by the application of metaphysical and not merely cosmologi
cal principles, teaches that the subsistent soul, having
vegetative, sensitive, and intellective powers, communicates,
in the order of formal causality, its esse to the body which
it needs, constitutes a substantial union with the body
through that one act of being, and yet surpasses the matter
of the body in its intellective powers whose exercise need
no corporeal organs*

In the Thomietie system, the intel

lectual soul as the form of the body transcends - but also
transfuses the body.

As we shall see,

the entire resolution

of this problem rests on the relation of matter surpassing
intellection and matter-immersed sensation, a relationship
wherein sensation is necessary for the acquisition of know
ledge but does not, nevertheless, deprive the intellect of
its autonomy in the actual act of understanding.
In theThomietie doctrine, man

takes on a nobility

granted to him by no other philosophy, namely the dignity of
an intellectual being, a little less than the angel and so
much more than the animal.

In the Contpa Gentjles.

St.Thomas surprisingly begins his treatment of the problem
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with th* #h#pt#r entitled: "That the Ferfeetiee of the Uni*

J

veree Require# the B#iete#ee ef Bmm Intelleetuel Creeturee.*^
One would ml##et think that he i# epeekiug etrietly ef
engele,

however, in the next twenty-one oîwaptere, which in-

elude hieterieel eoueideretien#, he preeeet# hi# re«olution
ef the prohlo» end hi# haeie deetrine on the nature of man.

^ Ihiâ.* #h. ii.
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CHAPTER II
ARIRTOTlBrTME 80UL AS THE FORM OF THE BODll
Appiyifig th# eo#mol#gic#l principle» which he hae
mxp&umémd in the fhxelee. Arietetle prove# in the following

mamner that the eeul ie united to the body.

After showing

that the soul is one principle eeasmen to the several types of
living thingsI he consider# the relation of the vegetative,
sensitive, intelleotive, and loooeotive powers to each other
and to the soul.

Me proceeds to do this by asking two

questions: (A) Is each of these powers a soul; (D) If each
power is only a part, is it separable, only as being thought
of as separate, or has it also a distinct place, as a separ
ate being, in a part of the body.

Giving consideration to

the see^md question first, he notes that, with regard to sons
powers, we quite easily see that they do have being in cer
tain parts ef the body;

ethers are not in any special part;

and ether powers cause us sons doubt.

This he illustrates

by reference to plant life, noting that sows plants can be
out, but continue to live when grafted or replanted;

in

which case the life principle appears to be one soul in act,
^ at. Aristotle,
1» the
version of William of Moerbeke...translated by Ken#In foster
and Silvester Humphries (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1951), pp. 187 - 194 (in II de Anima, lec. 4).
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but several in potency,®
Ariatetle continues his illwstretion with reference
to animais which can be cut in half, such as snakes and
frogs, but centinns to react in withdrawing from the tactile
stimulus of the pin;

consequently, the part would seem to

retain the principle of sensation and local movement, and
also imagination which Aristotle defines as "a movement never
originated apart from sensation,*^

Further, the divided part

must also have appetitien as is evident frmi its comfortseeking effort to avoid pain.

Thus, the divided part con

tains the vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, and locomotive
principles which are, then, not in any special part of the
body.

On the other hand, the external sense powers, with the

exception of the most fundamental and necessary one of touch,
are located in the special parts of the body, the sense organs*
Finally, "but as regards intellect and speculative
power, nothing has so far been demonstrated;

but it would

seem to be another kind ef soul, and alone capable of being
^ St.Thomas, in his commentary, draws attention to the
fact that the same thing is observable in the forms of inani
mate physical bodies which can be divided into parts but
retain the same nature, for example, rocks. ,££. St.Thomas
Aquinas, M âgiüfctiâlii. j U A m »
transImted by K«noim Foster and Silvester Husmphricei Aristc.tle.'.s
be Anima. in the version of William of Moerbeke; with the
commentary of St.Thomas Aquinas, (Londont Routlodge and
Kogan Faul, 1951), P.191 (in II be Apjma. lec.4, No, 26 4 ).
3 Aristotle, on. cit.... p. 394. (Do Anima H I , 418 blS).
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separated, ma the eternal from the periahable."^ Cempleting
hi# am ewer te the eecend queetien,. lie etatee, "By defltiitien, however, they are ebvieuely diatlnet.

Per if feeling

is ether than ©pining, the eenee faculty will differ from
the capacity te farm ©pinion».
other powers mentioned,"^

Likewise with each of the

Hence, these faculties and

powers, excluding the intellect and the speculative power
ef which no conclusion is here reached, are separable in
thought, and some, such as the sense organs and their
powers,are separable in place,
low he answers the first question posed, aa to
whether each power la a soul or a part of the soul, noting
that some animated beings have only one power, judging
from the vital operations;
others have all four.

others more than one; and yet

Where only one of these prineiples

is found, as is the case with the lower forms of plant
life, it is itself the soul;

however, where more than one

are found, as in the higher forms of life, the soul la
named after the hig)wr part or power.
Aristotle proceeds to set forth, in four parts,
4

p.m.

( I b u W m # II, 413 b 16).

^ Ibid.. pp.117-188. (De Anima II, 413 b 29).
^ at.Thomas Aquinas,
lee.4, no. 270).

p.191* (In II Dp Anima.
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th# argument whereby he oenoludea that the soul is "an
actuality and formal principle of a thing in potency to
exist accordingly"^ or, in other words, is that by which we
live, sense, move, and understand.
The major proposition is to the effect that if we
concede that there are two principles of our being and
activity, one will be prior to the other.

This he explains

observing that we can speak of the principle of life and
sensation from two points of view, formally or materially,
for example, when w#

speak ef the act of knowing as proceed

ing either from the knowledge

itself or from the soul, or

when we speak of becoming healthy either with regard to the
health itself or with regard to the body as becoming healthy,
one of these principle» is formal and the other is material.
As St.Thomas comment#*
for knowledge and health are forms or actualities of
certain subjects* knowledge is a form & f %tm soul that
knows; health of the body capable ef health. Thus, he
(Aristotle) says
'capable of knowing* and 'capable of
health' in order to indicate the particular subject's
aptitude to its particular form. For the actuality
of any active principle, such as the form transmitted
to matter by an agent, always appears to exist in
what receives it and is adapted to it, i.e. in the
subject, whose nature is to receive from one particu
lar active principle, and which is adapted to attain
the final term of the receiving process, namely the
form in qweetioia» »
7 Aristotle, m UM âSf» p.lSf. (Be Anima II, 414 a 28).
i 8t.Themes Aquinas,
p.193 (In H Be Anima.
loo, 4, No. 272). The reader's attention is drawn to the
statement herein of the proportion required between matter
and form.
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10

Slwâlarly, we #p#*k of there being two prineiples of
life, the soul and the body.

#e are said to live by the

body only insofar as th# body has a soul, the aotttality of
the body,

Hsnos, the body is the material pritioiple of life

and the soul is the formal prinoipl# of life.

Th# soul

then is prior to the body.
Th# analogy is made that as knowledge is a# a form
and spooifio essemoe to the, soul knowing* as health is as
a for# and spooifio osseno# to the body being healttqr, so
the soul is to the body as a speoifie form.

Being a

spooifio form, the soul is mot a material for, or a mere
subjeet of, anything.
To elinoh the argument, lest anyone say that the
body, which is a principle of life, is the form no less than
the soul, Aristotle motes that substance is predieated in
three ways* as the form, as the matter, and am wtiat results
as one from the coaqxisite of form and matter. %ith referonce to the latter, the body is clearly net the soul's
actuality, the soul being prior to the body as we have said
above. hence, it is the soul and not the body which is the
specifying principle, since it is clear that the body is
mot the form of the soul.
Prom the foregoing Aristotle deduces that the soul
is not a body, but is a part of the body, and therefore

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Il
"is in « b o d y * and in a body of a definite kind}

sinco

the act ia alwaya tbo act of that which i« in potency to it
He Goncitidesi "that the eotil, then, ie an actuality and
formal principle of a thing in potency to exiat accordingly
io evident from theme oeneideratieno.*
However, it «mot tee remembered that at the beginning
of hie diooouroo Ariatetle had maid, "but am regards intel
lect and opeonlative power, nothing hae ec far been
demonstrated;

but it would ooem to be another kind of soul,

and alone capable of being separated, as the eternal from
the p e r i s h a b l e The reason for this controversial remark
lies in the nature of the possible intellect, the exlstenoe
of which he posited because "whenever a thing is found to be
sometimes in potency and sometimes in act, there must be
11
some principle by which it is in potency,"
As man is sosetimes actually sensing and sometimes only potentially, it is
necessary to maintain that in man there la a sentient
principle which is in potency to sensible things. Similarly,
it is meoessary to maintain that, since man is only some
times actually understanding, in him there is an intellective
9 Aristetle,

p.l$$. (De Anima II, A U a 11).

I® St.Thomas demonstrates that the body of mam was given
an apt disposition for the soul, yjdet St.Thomas Aquinas,
gRM# T h m i W # #
(Ottawa*
W m g & W m m
ÊÈ&mlmmml#, w i - s ) , part %, q.9 1 , a.i.
II St .Thomas Aquinas, &ggggglgm
, translated by
John Patrick Rowan* The....Soul- (St.Louis* 8 , Herder book Co.,
1949), eh.l, p.11.
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12
power which is in potency to intelligible things;
12
Aristotle sails the possible intellect,

this

If, then, there is but one formal principle in man,
would mot the potentiality ef the possible intellect be
determined by the matter ef the body, since it is neither the
form nor the matter but the composite which exists and acts?
And yet, if, to avoid this pregnable position, Aristotle
meant his "intellect,,.would seem to be another kind of soul
..." to be taken literally, would not this be tantamount to
saying that there is not one but mere than one substantial
form in a man?

What, them, precisely is his doctrine?

bet

we now consider Averroes' answer to this question.

12 jZt. Aristotle, iawÜUê., P.4%5* (Do Anima III, 430 a 15)
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CHAFTBR III
AVBRR0E5 AND PLATO*
THE 8G0L m A N 8 CgNDBNT BUT NOT TRANSfUBINQ.
Literally imterpretleg Ariatetle'# diet»» that the
1
imtelleet ie "eepereble, both impaemihle and uneixed",
Averree# propoeee hie «newer te that questiem by aaeertimg
that it ie eeetrary to the mature ef the Imtelleetual soul
to be the form of the body.
Averreee wee a follower of the position that the
possible imtelleet, to be in peteney to « H intelligible
forma, must be devoid of every sensible mature,

from which

he Infers that the soul cannot be present in any body. ®
For Averroes, W m W m # M

A W z

"#*** being

totally estoraped by the matter of the body;

in other words,

he was of the opinion that there must be a ,i*e.r.fe.ct propor
tion between matter and form by reason of coamologioal
consideration#.

Per, he defines matter as a substance which

is in potency and form as a substance which perfects the
I Aristotle, Dm Amimhl
1 9 5 1 ), P.4 2 5 . (Ill, 4ÏÔ a 17).

(London,

® Averroes,....................... .
edited by P. Stuart Crawford, (Ca«d»ridge, Mass.* Wediaeval
Academy of America, 1953)» p.387» 1,15. (Cemmemtary on A&
m m . III. s).
13
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14
I

matter in potency to It.' the two are complementary to each
ether ## that from their coming together a unity

r e s u l t » ,

4

however, it ie a composite (unity) which "ie being in act
only through

the form",^

Thi# form cannot be the perfection

it i# except

that it existin the body^ as inseparable from

it.7
hence, he concluded that the intellect as the form of
the body would, in sharing in the determinate nature of the
body, have a determinate mature; consequently, it would not
be capable of knowing all tilings.®

This is so since it would

seem that it

would receive

nothing without its matter;as

prime matter

receives onlyindividual forms, which are indiv

iduated through being in matter, the possible intellect would
receive forms as individuated and would not ttien be cognizant
of universale.

Similarly, as prime matter is not cognizant

of the forms it receives, the possible intellect, having the
I I b M .. p.13b, 11.37*39. (Commentary on .Be..Anima. 11,2),
4 Ibid.. p.404, 1 1 .503 * 594 . (Commentary on ie .Anima,11. 5).
® â à M * » p.1 3 9 ,1 1 .44 * 4 6 . (Commentary on §«>....^nlpa. 11,7).
^ Ibid.■« p.1 6 7 ,11.16-17. (Commentary on Do Anima. 11,26).
^ Ibid.. p.161, 1 1 .44 - 4 6 . (Commentary on Do Anima. 11,22).
® 8t.Thomas Aquinas,

ffrfolomiae

(Ottawa, 1941-5),

pdrt I, q»75, ». 2 c* "Si igitur principium intellectuale
haberet in se naturam alicuius corporis non posset omnia
corpora cognoscere."
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mmmm receptivity, would not b# cognisant of the forms
reooivod.

Again, as Aristotle provom,9 an infinite power

cannot exist in a finite body.

However, the possible intel

lect ie endowed with a eertain infinite power, since by it
we know universal# which are potentially infinite in number.
10
For these reasons,
Averroes denied that the
possible intellect cam be united to the body as it« form.
However, this left him in the dilemma that follows from this
positiem* that understanding ia not attributed to this parti
cular man but rather to am Intellect separate from him.

In

order to avoid this incongruity, he taught that the possible
intellect "entirely separated from the body in its aetual
being, is

11

connected with 'this man' through phantasma." *

This is so in that the intelligible species, which ia the
perfection of the possible intellect, is founded in the
phantasms from which it is abstracted.

Hence, it hae a two

fold kind of aetual being: one in the possible intellect,
and the other in the phantasm from which it la abstracted.
The phantasms are in 'this mam' because the imagination ia
a

Aristotle, .ghvsies. translated by R. P. Hardie and
R. K. Gays. In#
,m#gi# W k #
, edited by
Richard McKeon, p p . til - 3#7 (New York# Randms House

e. 1941), VIII, 166 m 25 mg.
'££• Averroes, oB...eit.« pp. 387-388» 11. 27-37.
(Commentary on .Is..
..
Anima. Ill, 5).
II St.Thomas Aquinas,
» trans
lated by Nary C. fitapstrick* Dm Bniritual Creatures (Milwau
kee: Marquette University Fress, 1949), p. 34.
Averroes,
eB-..,ftit.. pp. 464-405, 11, f00-527. (Commentary on Pe Anima
III, S). Rets that "connected" translates eentinuatie.
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a power within « body;

that ia, it has a corporeal organ*

Thus there ariae» one thing from the possible Intellect and
the form undereteed in set.

The possible intellect is then

united to the form, which form ie else in union with the
phentaem which i* in man.

In this way, Averroes explains

that it is the particular man who understands.
Th# possible intellect met being the form of man,
Averroes sought to show that man differs specifically from
12
the brutes by the intellect which Aristetle call®"passive",
and which is the same as the cogitative power that is proper
to man.

To this he credits the functions of distinguishing

and comparing individual intentions and preparing, together
with the imagination and memory, the phantasms to receive
the sotien of the agent intellect, whereby the phantasms are
11
made intelligible in act.
Accordingly, to this power he
gives the name of 'intellect' or reason.
Thus, in the Averroeist system, man, composed of
matter and a form which is immersed in matter, is united by
eontinuatio to the intellectual soul (separate intellect) by
the intelligible species present in both the intellect know
ing and in the corporeal phantasm present in man.

(We will

I' aC' Aristotle, Rp
M
^.ondon, 1951), pp.425-416. (Ill, 436 a 2 7 );
Averroes,
p.454, 11.175*181. (Commentary on De Anima III, 20),
I® Averroes, nn^cit.. p.449, 11. 175*181. (Commentary on
j Wl m m 111, 26).
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consider later, in our treatment of St.Thomae, the question
ef the validity ef this poeition.)

The intelleotual soul,

then, in the doctrine of Averroes, transcends, being separate,
but dees not transfuse the body since it is not the form of
the body.
Plate's philosophy is very similar,

for reasons simi

lar to these which later led Averroes to refuse to accept the
intellectual soul as the form of the body, Plato held that
the soul is a self-m&bsistent and incorruptible form,^^ and
consequently denied that the intellectual substance could
inform the body.

Per him, the body would sees to be also an

actually existing subject, but different in genus since it is
corruptible.
Like Averroes, Plato had to explain how the action of
understanding is said to belong to the particular man.^^ Of
16
the three ways an action may be attributed,
Plato asserted
that man is said to understand in virtue of his whole self.
Per he said that the soul, constituting the full perfection
SC* Plate, SMMÉA* »o«* 17*88» where Plate speaks of
the soul as being self-restcrimg, self-reproducing, and
immortal, perpetually rmaewing itself from within. Vide*
fhamdeus. nos. 245*246. (All Plate references are to* The
Dialogues.of Plate, translated by Denjamln Jewett, (New York*
Random house, 1937), and to the marginal numbers in this
translation),
P*15.
Aristetle, EhZgjgg, M a M J t * » V, 224 « 31.
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of the specie», is united to the body, not as its form, but
17
18
only as mover to the movable,
the body being the vehicle
and imagel^ of the soul.

Thus he explains that the action of

understanding is attributed to the particular man inasmuch as
the man is the soul - "for surely there ie nothing which may
20
be called more properly ourselves than the soul**.
To account for the fact that the body lives and has
the character of its own species, which it could not have by
reason of the immortal soul, as the mover causes the motion
21
and not the being of the moved,
Plato stated that the form
22
of the body is a soul which is imprisoned in the body.
Judging from the way in which he described this soul, he seems
to be referring to what we would call the sensitive soul.
17

PlAto, Phaedrus. no. 245.

M M

I, no.892.

I® Plato, îiSâSMS, no. 69Plato, Laws XII, no, 959.
St.Thomas Aquinas, Be Sniritualibu» Creaturis. trans
lated by Mary C. Fitzpatricks On Sniritua1 Creatures (Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press, 1949), ch.2, pp. 35, 36. Cf.

PiAto, AlgibWme

«<». no»

21 St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles (Taurini;
Marietti, 1938), bk, II, ch. 57.
Plato, PhaedQ. no. 82.
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In #umm*ry, fch®«« prineipl®» of wmdormtamding, the
Separate latelloot of Avorroo# mod the immortal ®o«l of Plato,
are trammooodemt of the matter of the body,

îhie muet be eo

by reamom of the apparent determination of form by matter. For
both philomopherm, the intellectual principle e*l«t« in almoet
total eeparation from the matter of the body. Only the quaeinnionm of the

»«d the

ftLMg

movmr-moeed relationmhio earn be admitted into their emmentialimm.

Sttch a union doom not permit it to be maid that the

intellectual principle tranmfumem the body, for such trans
fusing can be maid only of that principle which enjoys that
intimacy of being the form of the body.

For the intellectual

principle, am the form of the body, would be determined by
the matter of the body. Consequently, they posited a material
or matter-immermed principle a# the form of the body to
account for the fact that the body lives and bam the character
of its own species.

Hence, it is the ‘passive intellect* in

the Averroimt mymtem and the "soul of another nature which was
mortal** Iti the Platonic system which transfuses the body as
its form,

The importance of this observation, nammly of the

soul or intellectual principle transcending but not trans
fusing, will bocom» more ®-vid®»fc in the light »f the Thonistlo
solution of the problem. For, therein we will find that,
despite the problem of determination, the intellectual soul
not only transcends but transfuses the matter of the body
being the form of the body.
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CWAPTE& IV
S*. TWONAa# TM& 80U& TKANaCBABR** A*B TKAW&PVai**
A. That the Soul Cem Be United to,
and laterally Require# the Body
A# we have #eem, a literal interpretation of
Aristotle's dictum that the intellect is ”separable, both
impassible and ummixed" meat result in the doctrine that the
intellectual soul, imasmueh as it transcends the body, can
not transfuse the body as its form.
however, 8t.Thomas objects to such an interpretation
of Aristotle and concludes that the Philosopher's doctrine
is "where several (i.e. of the vegetative etc. principles)
are found together each is a part of the soul and the soul
itself is named after the principal part whether sensitive
or intellectual as the case may be."*

Me finds it hard to

believe that Aristotle held that the intellect is a sub
stance separated from the body because anyone who states
that the intellect is a separate substance "implies that he
himself understands nothing;

and therefore then one need

pay no attention to what he says,

for it is clear that the

* St .Thomas Aquinas,
Gomppntapium. translated by Kenelm Foster and Silvester
A Mma,. in the version of William
Mumphries* Aristo.felels._..,Be._.
of Moerbekei with the cosmemtary of St.Thomas Aquinas,
(London* Rentledge and Kegan Paul, 19S1), p.192. (I n .11 do
Amina, lee. 4, no. 279).
20
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actually intelligent being is this particular man,"

2

A further argument may be adduced to show that
Aristotle thought that there was one formal principle, one
soul in an animal, the principle of all its activities. For,
he himself says "one of the kinds of things that are is
substance.

Of this, there is one element, matter, which of

itself, is no particular thing; another the form or species
according to which it is called this particular thing; and
3
a third, that which is both.
From the De Anima, it is
4
evident that he regards the soul as the form of the body.
Mow, since he says that form is that "by which it is called
a particular thing", it is difficult to envision him as
holding that one thing could be several (particular things).
Such would be the ease if he held that the intellect was
another kind of soul since, in essential attribution, man is
said to sense (by reason of the sensitive soul) as well as
to understand (by reason of the intellective soul).

In

other words, if both actions are attributed to man as opera
tions flowing from his essence, them one must credit to that
man the principles of those actions;

hence one would credit

to that man the sensitive and intellective souls as separate
formal principles or forms by which he would then become two
2 Ibid.. p. 408.

(In III de Anima, lec. 7, no.690.).

3 Aristotle, De Animai Aristotle's De Anima (London,
1 9 5 1 ), p. 163. (Ill, 412 a 6-10).
4 Ibid., p. 163.

(Do Anima II, 412 a 20).
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"particular things**.

The remaining alternative wowld he that

man i* an aeeidental union (which Aristotle definitely doe#
not hold).

The haeis for eueh a oonoluaion lie# in the fact

that whatever aeerwea to a thing after it# first substantial
fore will accrue to it accidentally.

Hence, if man's form

is said to be the intellective soul, the nutritive and sensi
tive souls will accrue to him accidentally.
Hence St.Thomas finds it hard to believe that, when
Aristotle says that the intellect "would seem to he another
kind of soul, and alone capable of being separated",^ in
which teat be (Aristotle) reaches no conclusion leaving it
for later consideration,
another kind of soul.

be meant that the intellect jj|

For, such an interpretation is bound

to lead to the teaching of that illogical doctrine of the
"plurality of forms" found in the philosophies of both Plato
and Averroes.

8t,Thomas finds it equally difficult to

believe that Aristotle held that the intellective soul is a
substance separated from the body.

Rather, Aristotle was

probably referring to the intellect's independence of the
body since it needs no corporeal organ for its action of
understanding.^
St.Thomae point# out the error of such «n interpretstiom of Aristotle's controversial statement by a critical
* j&id', p. 187. (Do Anima II, 413 b 24).
*

Ikld', p. 450 sq. (Be Anima III, 4%9 a 10 sq.).

7 St.Thomas Aquinas,
lec. 12, no. 786).

o p .cit..

p. 452. (In I,Il....d,e..ApAm.a.
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analysis of the philosophical psychologies of Plato and
Averroes who, as we have seen, deemed such an interpretation
necessary.

Averroes taught that the possible Intellect is

united to 'this man' because of the two-fold existence of
the intelligible species, namely as united to the intellect
in act and united to the phantasm from which it is abstracted.
Further, he has asserted that man derives his specific nature,
not from the possible, but from the passive intellect.
ever, this doctrine is unreasonable,

How

A thing is capable of

knowing, not because of the presence of the intelligible
species, but because of its cognitive power.

For Averroes,

man is capable of knowing because the Intelligible species is
present to man, but the power of understanding, i.e. the possible intellect, exists in complete separation from him.

8

What actually follows, St.Thomas notes, is that the particu
lar man is understood.

For, the actually understood species

is the form of the intellect, just as the actually visible
species is the form of the power of sight.

"As the species

of color are in the sight, so are the species of phantasms in
the possible I n t e l l e c t , In other words:
O
££* St.Thomas Aquinas, Qpusculum de Anima, translated
by John Patrick Rowan: The Soul (St«Louis: B. Herder Book
Co., 1949), ch. 2, p.24.
^ St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. The Summa Theo
logies of St.Thomas Aquinas, translated by The Fathers of the
English Dominican Province, 3rd ed.( London: Burns, Oates and
Washbourne Ltd., 1938). Direct translations in text and notes
are taken from this source, unless otherwise indicated.
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the intelligible epeeiee abstracted from the phantasm
is in the possible intellect in the same way as the
species 'color* is in the sense of sight. Mow the
intelligible spoeiem is in the phantasm.% in the same
way as a epeeies which makes seeing possible («necies
vimibilie) is i* the physical object which is a wall.
New owing to the fact that the epeeies which makes
seeing peseihle, the form 'sight' is based on the
color of the wall, the act of seeing is not connected
with the wall as with a seeing object, but as with a
seen object, for by means of it the wall dees not see
but is seen.19
Continuing the comparison we must conclude that the unavoid
able consequence of this is that man ig understood, not that
he understands.
In further criticism, eve#y kncwer la united to its
object by its cognitive power, as the agent la united to the
patient by the agent's operative power.

It is by his intel

lect as by his cognitive power that man is intelligent and
hence united to the intelligible.

This is in sharp contrast

to Averroes* conclusion that mam is united to the intellect
by the intelligible form.
Averroes* position might be sound if the intellect
in potentiality and the intelligible in potentiality were
one.

But this is not the case, for, while it is true that

11
"the intellect in act and the intelligible in act are one"
12
"just as the sense in act and the sensible in act"
arc one,

at.Thomas Aquinas, M „ jWÜCi&WmüklUI Ç,EM3mdL&» tranaIsted by Mary C. Fitspatrick# On ioiritMsl Grostsree.
(Milwaukee* Marquette University Press, 1949), ch.2,pp.34-35.
"

££• Arimtotl., a w d i . , p. 431. (B. Anl». Ill, 430 *3).

“

££. Ifeââ-. P-3S8. (fia_toiB8 11. 433 b 37).
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the Intellect in potentiality end the intelligible in petentielity ere net one.

The species of the thing a@ preeent

in the phamt### ie only potentially intelligible;

as present

in the intellect, it ie actually intelligible, having been
made eo by being abstracted from the phantasm by the light of
the agent intellect.

Therefore, the intelligible species

could not be the means whereby a separate possible intellect
could be brought into contact with man, because, in the
separate possible intellect, the species of the thing would
be fctuallv intelligible but not in contact with us; in the
phantasm, the species would be only potentially intelligible,
and therefore not in contact with the

i n t e l l e c t .

His position is further criticised in that he was
actually saying that the union of the possible intellect with
man, following upon the operation of man, gives mam his
species, namely of being intellectual; for, it takes place by
means of the imagination, which Aristotle defines as "a move
ment resulting from the exercise of a sense pcwer"*^ since it
1A
is "a movement never originated apart from sensation."
How
ever, that which follows the operation of a thing does not
** St.Thomas Aquinas, Êumma Contra Gontilos
1938), bk.Il, ch. 59.

(Taurini,

Uiisl. p.

££. Ari.totl.,
mW.,

395. ( n . Anl.« III, 429 a 2)

p. 394. (Ba Aoliwt III, 428 b 15).

57357
m

m

m

wi'JEffiiTY u m m v
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give a thing it® spool*#, for the «peoific thing smst exist
prior to th« operation.

Mono*, Averroes mistakenly denies

that man has intellect (formally speaking), and is forced to
distinguish him from brutes by something else, which would
seem to be that man is capable of being in continuation with
17
the separate intellect, whereas the brute animal is not.
Perhaps to meet such an objection, Averroes sought
to show that man differs in species from the brutes by the
intellect which Aristotle calls 'passive*,

This position is

answered in several ways by St.Thomas; ^ it will suffice for
18
cur purpose to note only one. The operations of a living
thing are compared to the soul as second acts to the first
act, which precedes the second in time in the same thing,
just as knowledge precedes reflection.

Row man has an opera

tion, namely of understanding, higher than that of the
animals.

Therefore we must attribute to man a principle that

gives him his proper specific nature, and which is related to
the act of understanding as first to second act.

Further,

since the soul is independent of the body, needing no corpor
eal organ, this principle cannot be immersed in matter. The
'passive' intellect, which is dependent on the aenae organs,
could not be such a principle.
17 St.Thomas Aquinas, $umm# .Contra. Gentiles. M l S H * #
bk.%1, ch. 5 9 .
ib&d., bk.II, ch. 60.
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Let Its recall that Plato taught that the soul»
constituting the full perfection of the epeeies » is united to
the body sot as fore but only as the mover to the mmved. The
body lives and has the character of its own species by reason
of a mortal soul of another mature,

We have noted the simila

rity of this to Averroes' union of the separate intellect to
mam who derives bis species from a mortal, matter-immersed
form, the 'passive* intellect.

Since sensation is predicated

essentially as well as understanding, to both philosophers
may be credited the doctrine of a plurality of forms, a doc
trine which at.Thomas attacks strongly in the Summa Gontra
6entilss**speeifically citing Plato. They would seem to be
reduced to the absurdity of saying either that man is three
beings by reason of the nutritive, sensitive and intellective
souls, or mao Jji by reason of one of the three, and the
remaining two will accrue to him accidentally, thereby consti
tuting man as an accidental being,

for every substantial

form makes a being complete in the genua of substance, the
form being the actuality of the matter and that by which a
thing is what it ie.
We have referred

20

to the fact that an action may be

said to belong to a thing in three ways.

The first Is

attribution through an accidental quality, which is impossible
as far as the action of understanding is concerned, since this
** ibid., bk. II, ch. 58.
** aaacA, p* 17.
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would mean that mam is am accidental union*

Further, we

have seen that Plato'# choice of the second alternative,
namely that understanding be said to belong to man in virtue
of his whole self me though he were but a soul, is really
the same as the first alternative.

Hemes St.Thom»» held to

the third way, namely that mam underatand» in virtue of the
21
intellectual principle which is a part of him so that it is
united to him, and, simoe the action of understanding is
predicated of mam essentially, the principle of this action
must be united to him as bis substantial form.
If the possible intellect were a separate substance
and united in any other way,
it would be impossible for a mam to understand by mean*
of it, because if a substance performs am operation,
that operation cannot belong to any other substance
than the one performing it. for, although one of two
substances can be the cause of the other's operation,
as the principal agent is the cause of the activity of
the instrument, nevertheless the action of the prin
cipal agent is mot numerically the same as that of the
instrument, for the action of the agent consists in
moving the instrument, whereas that of the instrument
consists in being mmvod by the agent and in moving
something else. Consequently, if the possible intel
lect is a substance existing apart from this or that
particular mam (as Averroes held) it is impossible for
the possible intellect's act of intellection to bo the
act of any particular m a n * »
hence he concludes that "there remains no other
explanation than that given by ârietotle - namely, that this

** at.Thomas Aquinas, @90#^ Th#*%9*A8#, a&sÊlk',
part I, q. 7©» a. 1 c.
** St. Thomas Aquinas, ()iwuuscul::m dbm AundLawi. ed. cit..
ch, 2, p* 33,
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particular man understands because the intellectual prin
ciple is his form", the possible intellect being "a certain
faculty or power of the soul."^^
How this could be was the problem which confronted
the Angelic Doctor in the thirteenth century.

On the one

hand, we have the nobility of the soul in its substantiality
and immortality ;

on the other hand , we have the unity of

man to be insured.

To posit the soul as the form of the

body would seem to endanger either one or the other.

If the

soul is a complete substance, a composite, it could not
enter into a further composition in an essential way;

thus

the human compound would be rendered an accidental unity.

On

the other hand, if we make the soul simple, in order to
safeguard the unity of man, it would be Immersed in matter
as a material form.

To unite these two extremes is the task

he undertakes in the pontpa....Gentiles.
St.Thomas begins by establishing that, since intel
lectual substance® are analogous to their Creator's nature,
operation and mode of operation in their intellect and will,
the existence of these intellectual substances is fitting
24
for the perfection of the universe.
After then establish
ing that the intellectual substance has will and freedom of
choice in acting, he proceeds to show that the intellectual
Ibid.
St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ed.cit.,
bk. II, ch. 4 6 .
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substance is not a body, nor a material form, and is immat
erial.

This he does arguing from the immaterial power of
25
understanding possessed by such a substance.
The argument is well paraphrased by Dr. Pegis, who
says:
the forms of things are not really intelligible un
less separated from their matter by the power of the
intellect in the act of knowing and at the moment
when they are received in the intellect. The intel
lect must therefore be free from matter in the sense
that neither is a part of it matter nor is it im
pressed in matter as are the material forms. In
other words, we can admit niether the composition of
matter and form in the soul nor the existence of the
soul in the body as a material form. 26
However, if there is no composition of matter and
form, what composition can be admitted in the intellectual
substance?

In a philosophy such as Aristotle's, wherein

form is the highest act, an insurmountable difficulty is
confronted here.
In the Thomistio doctrine, wherein recognition is
given to the act of existing (egse). metaphysics supplies
the answer,

For in God alone is esse (quo est) and essence
27
(quod est) the same.
In all other substances, inasmuch as

their existence is had not of themselves but from another,
25 j&id., Ohs. 47, 48
Anton C. Pegis, St.Thomas and the Soul (Toronto:
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1934), PP« 133-134.
^7 St,Thomas Aquinas, iSumqa T h e o l o g i a e . ed.cit., part I,
q.3, a.4} Summa Gontra Gentile*.. pAj-rIA., bk. I, ch. 22.
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'being* and ’what is* differ.

Hence, in the created intel

lectual substance there is a composition of forma and esse

or ammâ safe *©9 msumk*
Since that which belongs to a thing through itself
is always necessarily in it and inseparable from it, intel
lectual substances can never be deprived of being, for they
are themselves forms and ’being* is consequent upon form
29
through itself.
The importance of this point will be seen
shortly,
How, in order for it to be the substantial form of
30
the body, the intellectual soul must meet two requirements.
First, it must be the formal principle of the substantial
being of the thing whose form it is.

Secondly, the form and

the matter must be joined together in the unity of one act
of being.

As to the first condition, it is to be noted that

the soul is said to be the formal, and not the productive,
principle whereby a thing exists and is called a being.

This

is a distinction which could not be made in the essentialist
philosophy of Plato who, like Aristotle and many others,
failed to attach any significance to the act of ’esse *j con
sequently, Plato, for one. Identified the orders of efficient
28 Ibid.. ch. 52Î St.Thomas Aquinas, Le **De Ente et Essen
tia" (Paris* Librairie Philosophique, J, Vrin, 1948), ch. 4
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ed.cit..
bk. II, ch. 55.

30 Ibid.. ch. 68.
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and formal causality.**

If the soul were united to the body

#s Its efficient eaume, a thing one in being would not result;
hence, the second condition would net be fulfilled.

Mow "it

is obvious that the soul is the reality which gives life to
the body.
existing

Moreover, vital activity Cyivere) Is the act of
of living things.^* Consequently the soul is

that which gives the body Its act of existing."33
It oust be resesbered, however, that the single act of
being does not belong in the same way to the matter as to the
intellectual substance. "For that act of being appertains to
the corporeal matter as its recipient and its subject raised
to a higher level; it belongs to the intellectual substance
as to its principle, and in keeping with its very own nature."34
Thus is answered the objection that the soul, being of the
genus of the incorporeal, could not communicate its being to
corporeal matter,

for, together in the one act of existing,

they are of one and the same genus as principles of it;

if

they existed apart, the intellectual substance and the body
31 Sf. Btienne Gilson,
#8* ÜHaMMK
,
2nd ed., (Toronto* Garden City Frees Co-operative; 1952)»
ch. S.
3* Aristotle,
p. 111. (R*
II,
415 b 13). "In all things that live, to live is to bo."
33 @t.Thomas Aquinas,
oh* Up fi* 9#
34 8t.Thomas Aquinas, ##00* GTm&KAGmatl&T*, # 4 ,Æit',
bk. 11, oh. **.
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would b# #p#ci#e of diverse genera.
35
Disregarding for the moment the problem of receptivity,
it i# evident, from the foregoing, that, communicating it#
own being to the body, the intellectual eubetamce can be
united to the body aa it# eubetantial form, constituting a
substantial unity, the two existing by the soul's one act of
being.
Thus, cam we contemplate that "actively engaged in It,
the soul is giving itself the body which it needs;

it

progressively builds it up through physiological operations
which pave the way for intellectual operations."** For it is
of the soul's very nature to be united to the body

"not as a

thing having a complete species of its own, but as completing
37
the human species by being the form of the body";^' a sub
stantial perfection evidenced by the fact that "when the soul
leaves the body, the body's individual parts retain their
original names only in an equivocal sense."**
further the soul is united to the body

for am accident

al perfection, for "inasmuch as the soul isnaturally capable
of acquiring immaterial knowledge from material things,
** Sunra. pp. 14 - 15.
** Gilson, a m

, p. 186.

*7 at.Thomas Aquinas, Onusculum de.Amim#.
ch. 1, p. 10.

Mi*

’* ISiâ., p. 9.
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evidently it# epeeiee eea be complete only when it ie united
to a body; "for » thing's epeeies is complete only if it has
the things necessary for the proper operation of it#
epeeies,"** "The soul united to the body cam understand only
by turning to the phantasms, as experience

shows.

"40 These

phantasms, from which the intelligible species Is abstracted
by the agent intellect, actualieing the possible intellect,4*
41
though intermittently,
are dependent upon the sense organs
of the body,

hence it is for its own good that the soul,

understanding "by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are
in corporeal

organs,

"43 i# united to the body which it needs.

Since Plato maintained that the participation of forms
by material things is for the sake of material things, he
could of course see no reason why the subsistent form, the
human soul, should be united to the body;

in keeping with

his belief, if the soul were united to the body, it would be
**
à ià r m J& I

Aalaa, i#**

p. li; if* St.Thomas Aquinas, .In Aristotclis
» M t s iâ * » p .4 2 9 , (laJü Ü L d m
1 *,

**» 734).

4® St.Thomas Aquinas, &uama.._TMol@gime. #d..cit.. Part I,
q. #9, a 1 c.| af. St.Thomas Aquinas, In. A.rimtotmlis librum
lec. 7, no. 69I),

p* 409.

42 gg.Thomas Aquinas, SEsJEif*» P* 40*. (In 111 de Anima,

lec, 7, no. 6f2).
A M . , p. 413.
61* St.Thomas Aquinas,
p. *0 3 .

i*©* », »©«* 7oo, 701)
JEtoft> ââaSiâ*» o h , IS,

43 St.Thomas Aqmin»#, P s m m
q. *9, a. 1 c.
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imprisoned and entombed by the human body.

To the contrary,

as Aristotle had seen, matter exists for the sake of form,
the human body for the sake of the seul.

Thus the human

body is considered as having been given am apt disposition
for the soul.44 Since"the proximate end of the human body
is the rational soul and its operations”,4* we cam contemp
late the unity of the composite from the point of view of
final causality by attending to the end of the intellectual
being, man, namely Truth.
One might question, in view of the soul's immortality
and need for the phantasms, whether the soul separated from
the body cam understand anything. This St.Thomas answers
noting that the soul "when united to the body, consistently
with that mods of existence, has a mode of understanding by
turning to corporeal phantasms which are in corporeal
organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a
mode of understanding by turning to simply intelligible
objects, as is proper to other separate substances”,4* re
taining its proper being when separated from the body. 47
44 Ibid.. q, 91, ». 3» n.b., the replies to objections.
(f.St.Thomas Aquinas, RgmMMlk* d # . . W # ,
©h. 8,
pp. 100 - 101.
4* St,Thomas Aquinas,
q. 91, a. 3 c.

ed.cit.. part I,

" Ikid'» q. 89. ». 1 c.
47 iâîM*# d* 76, a. 1 gjj 6
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icw cm®

mrgw# that God should havs ordorsd the

soul's mmtur# so that it would hsvo hooa ustursl for it to
uudorstaad is the sohlar way, sasmly hy turmisg to simply
istalligihls ohjsots for which it would sot hsvs s«sds4 ths
body,

Wowsvor, "if ths imfsrior substsmoss [ h m m n

roooivsd spsoiss Is ths asms dogrss of usivsrsslity as ths
superior suhstasoss Issgsls], siso# they ars sot so strong
is umdsrstsnding, ths hssmlodgs whish thoy would dsrivs
through ths# would ho impsrfoot, asd of gsnsrai and oomfussd
nature . , . . Therefore to make it possible for human souls
to possess porfsot asd proper hsswledgs, they were so made
that their sature required them to he Joined to bodies, and
thus to reoeive the proper asd adequate knowledge of sensible
things from ths sensible things themselves."4*
Is short "the human soul is united to the body both
for a good mhish is a substantial perfeotism; and for a good
whieh is an sssidestal perfsotima, namely, the perfeotin# of
the soul in imtellsotual ksewledge whieh it aequires from
the sensesI for this mode of understanding is natural to
it
mam,"
Having its own esse, the soul oan exist apart from
the body and understand by turning to simply intelligible

48

a# i s.

49 at .Thomas Aquinas, RmWNhlm# 6# W * # » « u u a a »
oh. 1, g|| 7# p« 13,
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objects^but bam am aptitude and a natural inclination to be
united to the body which it need® and give# itmelf, communi
cating it* own being Cemme) to the body;

together they

constitute a unity of being,

B, The Soul Excecdc the Proportion of Matter
From what ham them far been maid, it ie apparent that
the ooul exceed* the human body in it# being and operation,
and that, contrary to Avorroaa' euppomltion, a perfect pro
portion ia not required between matter and form.

Aa under

standing Im a vital activity belonging essentially to man,
its principle meat be the soul, the principle of life.

Am

operation follows on being, the human aoul'a mode of eximting cam be known from it# operation,

The activity of

understanding im not offacted by mean# of the body.

This

operation haa no bodily organ, but ia an operation tranaceiidina the material order,

"hence the actual being of that

principle (i.e. of umderatanding, namely the soul), must be
an actual being which ia raiapd. abpv# corporeal matter and
not dependent on it",*® mince, "inasmuch am the human soul
haa an operation tranaconding the material order, its act of
existing transcends the body and does not depend on the
body."**

Hence, "though the form and matter are united in

St.Thomas Aquinas,
ch, Sc,, p. 34,

'SâifiiS*»

51 St.Thomaa Aquinas, Qcnsewlum d m Anima. gaWuLt', ©h, 1,
p. 11.
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the one act of boiog, the matter mood not alway# foe commonaurat® with the form.

Indeed the higher the form the more it
S3
murpaoeoo matter in it® being."
fhie ia made evident by examining the order of forms

through the observation of their operation#, sinoe each
thing aota according aa it haa being,
Row the lowest of theme, namely those of inanimate
bodies, are wholly immersed in matter, aa is evidenced by the
fact that they have no operation# of their own.

Sometimes,

we are perhaps tempted to attribute operations to then, but
these are actually "limited to the class of those proper to
the qualities such as heat, cold, moisture and dryness,
rarity and density, gravity and levity, etc."**
With a view to the continuity of nature, St,Thomas
stated

that higher than these forms are the formm of mixed

bodies which lie somewhat midway between the forms of the
simple elements which we have first mentioned and the higher
forma, namely those of animate beings,*4i# this he cites aa
** St.Thomas Aquinas, %!###
mAagii*,
bk.II, oh, 6i| nf. St.Thomas Aquinas,
* The
Summa Theologies of St.Thomas Aquinas, translated by the
fathers of the Sngliah Dominican Province. 3rd ed. ^London:
burns, Oates and Washbourne Ltd., 193»), part I, q. 76,
a. 1 c., vol. 1, p. 27, "the nobler a form ia, the more it
rises above matter, the leas it ia iswerged in matter, and
the more it excels matter by its power and its operation."
** St,Thomas Aquinas, Summa^ Contra_GentjLjea. sâiSiS*»
bk. II, ch, 68.
^4 j M A '
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## example the ledeetome who*# epermtiom ef attraction he
credit# to a power received from, and eoneequent upon, the
epeclce of the heavenly hcdlee.

This mac not a philosophical

error on bis part, but a result of the fact that his scienti
fic knowledge of the nature of magnetic forces was deficient.
What he took to be something different is, in fact, but
another disposition of matter.
However, a continuity is seen in the microscopic
organisms of plant life.

For the forms of such plants, and

for that matter all plants, are the intrinsic principles by
which the plant lives and haa self-movement aa evidenced by
the opérations of nutrition, growth, and generation.

Hence

these forms have a greater nobility them the forms of inani
mate beings which have no operations of their own.
In this lower order of vitality there seems to be
greater and lessor perfection of life:

the almost inanimate

microscopic organisms, the diminutive duckweed, the poppy
whose shoots bend and bow to the different points of the
compass and follow the path of the awn on its senith, the
sver-aproading prickly pear of India, the purslane and chickweed whose seeds continue to ripen oven when the plant is
uprooted, plants which revive year after year.

Some bear

marked ressmhlanco to animal life: the pea whose tendril
moves apparently in circular avoidance of the touch of the
twig, the Desmoduam of the Ganges Basin whose leaves are in
constant motion, the Venus flytrap of ths Caroline swamps,
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and the insect-eating sundew.

The operations, flowing from

these forms, are through, and for, the matter of the composite;
as such, they fail to surpass the proportion of matter.
Bearing in mind St.Thomas' dictum that "it is always
found that the lowest in the higher genus touches the highest
55

of the lower species",

we note that the transition from

plant life to animal life is aa gradual as that from inanimate
beings to living plants.

Among the lowest of the animals we

find the plant-like sponges, sohphytes, corals, the sluggish
sea squirt, the single-celled amoeba, and the edentates of
more active vitality.

But they are the forms of the brute

animals which "resemble the higher substances not only in
moving, but even, somehow, in knowing, so that they are capable
of operations to which the aforesaid qualities (dispositions of
matter) are of no assistance even organically, although these
operations are performed only by means of a bodily organ."
Modern physiology and experimental psychology have
contributed to explaining the "somehow" of St.Thomas' statement
and have also banished the misconception, scientific not philo
sophic, that the qualities which are dispositions of matter are
not of assistance in the acquisition of sense knowledge.
Further, they have borne witness to Aristotle's and St.Thomas'
dictum that the soul has not just any kind of a body but one
aptly disposed for the soul.

Correctly interpreted, they have

** St.Thomas Aquinas, op.cit., bk.II, ch, 68.

56
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made clearer both the immateriality and materiality of sense
knowledge.

The Immateriality of sense knowledge, and hence

of the sensitive soul, lies in the fact that such a knowledge
consists in the reception of the sensible species of the known
57
without its matter.
On the other hand, such knowledge is
material as it is not had except through corporeal organs.
All impulses arising from stimulation are transmitted
SS
to the specific areas of the brain.
This organ seems to be
the corporeal organ of the sensu* commupjs. integrating the
separate sensations into a meaningful whole.

It has been

found that the human cortex is much more perfectly developed
than that of brutes.

There is a reason for this* the human

smnsua communis must be properly disposed to formulate a
phantasm which can serve as the sensuous basis of intellectual
knowledge.

For it is the human soul which, in addition to

vegetative and sensitive powers in common with the lower forms
of life, "has an activity that goes entirely beyond matter and
does not take place through a corporeal organ; namely under
standing.

And because the actual being of a thing is pro

portioned to its activity, as has been said, since each thing
acts according as it is being (ens), it must be the case that

57 St.Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotells Libros de Sensu et
âemAato.. de M#mo.r.im.._et._Ê@miniscemtia. Cemmentarium (Taurini *
Marietti, 1897), lu. I .de. Sensu, leo. 2, no. 20. Cf. Ip
ArlstotelisLibrum de Anima Cemmentarium. ed, cit.. bk. II,
lec. 5, no. 248; bk.III, leo. 13, nos. 787-788.
58 £f. Karl U. Smith and William M. Smith, The Behavior
of Man. An introduction to Psychology (Hew York: Henry Holt
and Company, 1958), p. 98.
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the actual being of the human soul surpasses the corporeal
matter and is not totally embraced by it."

Co

By its external powers, the human soul, through the
corporeal receptor organs impinged on by an object, can dis
engage the form from the matter of that object.

60

nal sense power, the sensus communia.

Its inter-

discriminates between

these particular resultants at the same time as it unites
them into perpetual wholes called perceptions.
The sensus communis receives its object in a nobler
way than the external sense power "because it lies at the
very root of sensitivity, where this power has its point of

61

greatest union";

hence, we say that it has a greater immat

eriality for it collects data not from the external sensibles,
but from the external senses themselves.
But the human soul possesses another more immaterial
power which does not require the presence of an object actu
ally touching on a receptor as the external senses and sensus
pommunis do, but which can, though dependent on previous
62
sensation,
recall things that are no longer present to the
St.Thomas Aquinas, De. S.oiritualibus Creaturi.s. ed.cit..
ch. 2, p. 36.
60 St.Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotells Librum de Anima
)arium. .ed.., cit... pp. 369-374* (In III de Anima, lec.3,

4* A i à ' , p. 373 . (In III de Anima, lac. 3, no. 612 ).
62
Ibid.. pp. 369-374 (In...Ill, de Anima. lec. 6 , no. 659).
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outer senses, namely the imagining power,

63

which is found in

man and in some irrational animals, and only indeterminately in
the lower rational

a n i m a l s .

xt is a more perfect cognitive i

Instrument than the sensus communis as it does not require the
presence of an object for its function, and is in this respect
like the power of reason;

hence St.Thomas describes it as a
65
permanent principle of knowledge.
Still more noble is the soul's power of memory by which it
66
can recall past apprehensions;
because of this greater nobil
ity, it is found only in the more perfect animals.

For in

animals the principle of memory is merely the experience of
biological values, that is,of the usefulness or harmfulness of
67
certain things,
while in man it is won only with difficulty
and, like the imaginai power, benefits from its association
with the intellect.
The human soul, like the animal soul, has the benefit of
the concupiscible and Irascible appetites, but which differ in
man by reason of the appetite's being moved by the particular
Ibid.. p. 3 83 .

(In.
..11.1 ...cle,.Anima. lec. 4 , no. 633).

64 Ibid.. p. 390. (In III de Anima, lec. 5, no. 644);
p. 480. (In ill d o Anima, lec. 16. no. 839).

Ibid. . p. 497.

(In III de Anima, lec. 18, no. 873).

66

St. Thomas Aquinas, In I de Sensu, ed. cit.. lec. 1,
no. 12. in I de Memoria et Reminiscentia. ed. cit.. lec. 1,
no. 309.
67
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. ed. cit.. part I,
q. 78, a. 74, passim.
68
St. Thomas Aquinas, In I de Memoria et Reminiscentia.
e d . cit.. lec. 8, nos. 399-400.
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reason (cogitative power) which In turn is guided by the uni
versal reason.
69
the will.

Further, these appetites are subservient to

Over and above these powers of perceiving, imagining
and remembering, the soul also possesses the power by which
it can discern the useful and the obnoxious character of
certain objects.

In its purely sensitive state, as in the

irrational animals, this is known as the estimative power; in
man, because of its link with the intellect, it takes on
something of a rational nature and so St,Thomas calls it
70
cogitative power or particular reason.
Whereas "in brute
animals... the estimative power, or instinct, is a sort of
natural prudence...in man the estimative sense is called the
cogitative power.

It apprehends the individual objects as

the real and concrete subjects of the universal essence con
ceived by the intellect.

For that reason, and because it can

conjure these individual intentions, it is called particular
reason."

71

"When the object is present, the intellect will

abstract directly from the phantasm of the common sense.

If

it is absent, the imagination will furnish the phantasm. The
6o

St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa. fheologiae. ed. cit.. part I,
q, 81, a. 3,
70
St.Thomas Aquinas, In Arlstotelis Librum de Anima
gomment,arium. ed, c i t .« pp. 257-258. (In II de Aniwia'. leo.13 .
nos. 395 - 396)1
Henri Renard, The Philosophy of Man (Milwaukee: The
Bruce Publishing Company, 1948), pp.llO, 111, ( St.Thomas
Aquinas, Summa, Theoloaiae. ed..,.,.cAt.. part I, q. 78, a. 4 . )
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cogitative power is constantly used in dealing with knowledge
of individuals and is a sort of prolongation of the intellect,
so that in man there is frequent interaction between these
faculties,
From these phantasms, formed through those corporeal
powers of the soul, it can now, by its highest power which has
no corporeal organ, abstract the intelligible species or essence
of that object which has first stimulated the external sense
power.

Because of its ability to grasp the essence of the thing

through a universal, immaterial concept in the act of knowing,
through a power not rooted in any corporeal organ, the soul
itself must be immaterial and transcending the capacity of all
corporeal matter.

The soul is consequently "said to be on the

horison and confines of things corporeal and incorporeal, in
that it is an incorporeal substance and yet the form of the
body"

71

having "operations and powers in common with the body;

such, for example, are the powers of the nutritive and sentient
pa r t . " ? 4

Like all immaterial substances, as St.Thomas says, the
75
soul is endowed with will.
There is in all things an appetite for the good which
ibid., p' 114.
St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ed.cit..
bk. II, ch. 68 .
74

St.Thomas Aquinas, Opusculum de Anima. ed.cjt.. ch, 2

p. 25.
St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra. Gentiles. ed.cit..
bk. II, ch. 47.
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is sought by the action of the agent.

Now the actions of

natural things, devoid of knowledge and in which this desire
is called a 'natural appetite*, follow not on their own forms
but from forms outside themselves.

As we have mentioned

above, the movements of plants, though the principle of their
movement is intrinsic, follow on those things of nature which
nourish them (sun, earth, water) and by which they are genera
ted (bees. Insects and wind).

Brute animals, though they move

themselves in the sense that one part of them moves another,
are actually moved by the forms of things sensed and imagined
upon which appetition follows, through their senses and from
the judgement of their natural estimative faculty.
However, the forms understood, through which the
intellectual substance acts, proceed from the intellect itself;
hence the operation is in the power of the intellectual sub
stance which is itself productive of the form on which the
action follows.

In that the intellectual substance has mastery

of its own action, it follows that it is endowed with will.
Since, through its intellectual cognition, it judges of things
to be done, and since it has mastery of its own action as we
have just shown, the intellectual substance has freedom of
76

choice in action*

Freedom of choice and will constitute one power,

77

which is immaterial, because the will is not subject to any

ibid., ch. 48
77 St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologlae. <ad.,. cit.. part I,
Q,*

-Si»

3y

8 a

4 »
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particular good but has a capacity for the universal and
78
perfect good.
Hence both intellect and will enjoy the
Immateriality of the universal object which debars the medium
of a corporeal organ.
However, the intellect holds supremacy and nobility
over the will absolutely speaking, since the intellect's
object is the more simple and more abstract idea of the
appotibl© good which is the will's object.

Since the proper

nature of a power is proportionate to Its object, and the
object of the intellect is nobler and higher in itself by
reason of its simplicity and greater degree of abstraction,
the Intellectual power must be higher and more noble than that
of the will.
On the other hand, relatively speaking, the will is
sometimes higher than the intellect for the following reason.
The end of the intellectual operation is the possible intel
lect's union with the actually intelligible species at which
time knowledge is had.

Hence St.Thomas says that the action

of the intellect consists in that the idea of the thing under
stood is in the one who understands.

To employ an often-used

expression, the thing understood has intentional being in the
knower.

The act of the will consists in that the will is

inclined to the thing itself, not as having intentional being,
but as existing in itself.

Hence when the soul wills, or is

inclined to, a good more noble than the soul, in which is the
idea understood, "by comparison with such a thing, the will is
78

a, 2 Ad 2.
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higher than the i n t e l l e c t B u t when the good is less noble
than the soul, the intellect holds supremacy.
In keeping with this doctrine, in this life, the love
of God, Who is more noble than the soul, is better than the
knowledge of God, but knowledge of corporeal things is greater
than the love of them.

However, in the case of the Beatific

Vision, where we have God's own knowledge of Himself, the
Intellect is more noble,

Therefore, man's ultimate end lies,

not in the love of God, but in the knowledge of God.
From these powers of intellect and will, it is seen
that the human soul, though a form united to the body, is not
embraced completely by the body as though immersed in it as
AA
other material
forms are, but transcends the capacity of the
whole of corporeal matter, the potentiality for intelligibles
exists in the soul and this (potentiality) belongs to the
possible intellect.

Certainly the soul, so far as it is united

to the body, has operations and powers in common with the body;
81
such, for example, are the powers of the sentient part.
Thus
does the soul transfuse the body.

It still remains that the

79 Ibid.. a. 3, a. 4î St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra, Gen^
tiles. 9.^1* cit.. bk. Ill, ch.2b.
80 This is one of the few places in which St.Thomas refers
to the human soul as a 'material' form. It is 'material' in so
far as it is a form of matter and therefore in matter, but not
as being submerged in matter.
81 St.Thomas Aquinas, Qpusculum de Anima, translated by
John Patrick Rowan: The Soul (St.Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949),
ch. 2, pp. 25 * 26.
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possible intellect is separate, not in the sense of existing
apart from man, but as being free from matter in its operation,
being not a power rooted in a bodily organ.

Since this infin

ite power is not placed in a magnitude but is rooted in the
intellectual substance, we have no cause for concern at
Averroes' objection that an infinite power cannot be placed in
82
a finite body.
Man is said to understand formally by means
of the intellect Inasmuch as it is rooted in the essence of
his soul.

That "the possible intellect is a certain power or

faculty of the human soul" and not a separate substance, is
evident from the fact that understanding is not had without
the corporeal phantasms, which situation we have discussed
above#
Since a perfect proportion is not required and the
soul is not immersed in matter, and since the intellect is not
the act of any part of the body, it follows that its receptive ness is not that of prime matter,

for Intellectual receptive-

mess and operation are altogether without a corporeal organ.
On first realising this capacity to possess all other
being, one is apt to succumb to a kind of spiritual snobbery
in which the body is seen as a hindrance, a prison of the soul,
or at best "a mere tool to be tossed aside when its edge is
§4
blunted,"
To do so is to lose sight of the very nature of
8:
83

êmm»

P*15.

££. ggaCA, p.14

84 Walter Farrell, O.P., Mv Wav of Life, the Summa (Summa
yhe.olo.giae of St,Thomas Aquinas) simplified. (Pocket ed.
Brooklyn: Confraternity of the Precious Blood, 1952), p. 94.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

so
the soul and consequently the nature of man.

For the soul

needs the sense-receptors, the twelve billion neurones, the
wonderful complexity of the nerve tracts, and the brain of
the body for the production of the phantasms from which it may
abstract the intelligible species. Hence, the body is not
merely a tool nor a clumsy impediment to the soul's powers; it
has a certain nobility in that, aptly disposed, it co-operates
in the acquisition of truth with the soul by which it is trans
fused and thus given nobility.
In speaking of the human soul's need of the body,
Etienne Gilson says "the cause of such a need is a certain
8S
incompleteness in actuality."
He goes on to explain that
the soul does not need to be confirmed in its own nature:
As has been said several times, there is no form of
the form nor any act of the form qua form, but it
still needs to become more fully that which it is....
Always in existential potency to the absolute full
ness of its own being, such a form is bound to exert
manifold operations in order to fill the privation
of actuality which it suffers: not a privation of
essence but that of substance which still fails com
pletely 'to be' its own essence, and which in order
more fully to be must achieve its own being by
exciting a series of operations, each of which shall
ultimately bring it a step nearer to its own com
pletion. B6
In erery created being there is an "incompleteness
in actuality" for in God alone is Hi® essence His "to be."
All creatures exercise their act of existing only by reason
of the Pure Act and hence in a limited way "being always in

s^

Gilson, OP, cit.. p. 180,
Ibid.. p. 181.
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existential potency".

In them there must always be a composi

tion of act and the principle of limitation, potency, 'esse*
and 'quod est', since ease cannot be the source of its own
limitation as, if it were, an effect would pre-exist the cause.
Nor are these, 'esse' and *quod est'. to be taken as two exist
ing things, for 'esse' i s not a thing, not an essence, nor has
an essence any reality without 'esse*. Rather, they are two
metaphysical constituents, two real principles, which combined
produce a third, namely the composite which we call 'ens*.
Now a spiritual substance is the composite of 'esse*
(quo est) and 'forma' (quod est ) . In them the form or intellec

tual substance is the very essence.

However, that composite

being, man, is still further removed from the First Principle
and in him there i s an even greater limitation or incomplete
ness in actuality.

For in man there is a two-fold composition,

'esse' (act) and 'essentia* (quod est - potency), the latter
being a unity produced by the composition of the two metaphysi87
s a l c onetituent s »forma * (act) and 'materia* (potency).
Already enjoying its own act of existence as an actually
existing substance, the human form, the soul, can have no
further act, as such would result in an accidental being; as
an already existing form, it can have no other form, as such
would entail a regression to infinity.

Hence it does not and

cannot "need to be confirmed in its own nature."

But it is

87 St.Thomas Aquinas, Be Ente et Essentia, translated by
Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B.; On Being and Essence (Toronto:
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), ch. 4 .
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am intellectual substance which is on the confines of spiritual
88
and corporeal creatures, the powers of which meet in the soul*
The soul is a substance which is not the total essence
of man.

In order to exercise its intellectual powers, the soul

must first e x e rc is e its vegetative powers to preserve the body
which it meeds.

I t must e x e rc is e i t s sensitive powers that the

body may perform those acts of sensation which result in the
production of the phantasm.

Only then can the soul exercise its

intellectual powers, rendering actually intelligible the form or
species so that the form or species may be one with the possible
intellect.

Finally in order that the thing be known, the

essence bad in t h is simple apprehension must then be restored
by the soul's judgement to its own act of existing, for it is
the composite union of esse and essence which constitutes the
actually e x is tin g th in g .

Thus th e soul, in exercising this

s e rie s of powers and o p e ra tio n s , may attain to a knowledge of
the created th in g s o f the universe, and may proceed by reason
to a certain analogical and mediate knowledge of the Cause of
$o
these e f f e c t s .
It is only after its separation from the body that the
soul may ultimately rejoice in the repose of that immediate
90
intellectual violon, through the aid of the Divine illumination,

O0
St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. sâ«£i=â* > part i,
q. 77, *. 2o.
^9 Ibid.. q. 12, a. 12 c.
90 Ibid.. a. 5,
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of that Cause, the Source of all truth, which vision consti
tutes his felicity;

only then can the soul embrace in the

ecstasy of the fullest love of which the will is capable, the
91
Source of all good so presented to it by the intellect.
Nor
is the soul's enjoyment of this happiness to be marred by a
futile inclination to be united to the body, for this futility
is dissolved in the resurrection of the glorified body, and its
reunion with the soul.

As it im the whole man who exercises

the earthly mode of existence, so it is the whole man who exer
cises the heavenly mode of existence.
In the unity of the one act of being, proper to the
soul and communicated to the body by the soul, surpassing the
corporeal world by h is intellectual power which can have no
corporeal organ, man subsists and tends by his manifold powers
and operations toward that repose in the understanding of Divine
Truth which is his final end and, achieved, the full perfection
of his being.

Man is not a rational animal.

He is an intel

lectual being whose existence is the working out of an intel
lectual soul, which, in itself transcending matter, achieves
rationality in th e ordered union with matter, to work through
rationality to the intellectuality of the final vision of
Truth Itself.

9^ St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ed.cit..
bk. Ill, ch. 25.
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APPENDIX

Besides the works already mentioned, there are
several relatively recent arguments pertinent to the topic
of

this thesis, and d e a lin g with some of the more urgent

difficulties involved in its implications and ramifications.
In particular, there have come to the writer’s attention four
articles appearing in the New Scholasticism, which is pubquarterly by the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
In one of these. The Raison D ’Btre of the Human
Composite. According to St.Thomas Aquinas.^

John D. MoKian

discusses the reason for man's existence in terms of the in
trinsic ratio of the hierarchy of being, which God has instituted for H is own purposes.

2

H is approach is much the same

as that of St.Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Contra Gentiles, in
that he begins at the Summit of the hierarchy - God, Pure
Esse, the Transcendent Source o f this hierarchy of being.
After e s ta b lis h in g that God i s pure existence, and
hence pure goodness, and noting that "since every agent oper
ate» in order to produce what 1» like to itself, then the

^ John D. McKian, "The Raison D'Etre of the Human Compo
site, According to bt.Thomas Aquinas", The New Scholasticism.
XVIII (1944), 42 - 75.

54
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perfection of any

effect

will consist precisely in some

likeness to th e agent upon which it depends for the existence
it receives",^ he notes that the Thomist may find in the
order of God’s creation, a sense in which this order may be
said to require the presence of man, an effect which attains
its perfection by"returning to i t s cause"^ in its operations
of understanding and willing.

Man's presence may be said to

be re q u ire d in that "a break or a gap between the spiritual
and corporeal orders of creation would be repugnant to such
an orderly graduation"^ - the g raduation of being arranged by
the Master Architect in a hierarchy according to their de
grees of participation in His own perfection.

"In having to

look to sensible things for all his knowledge, man necessarily
affords those things the opportunity of making their due con
tribution to the formal extrinsic glory of God.

In this way,

the concert of creatures giving praise to their maker is com6
pleted."
The article is closed in giving consideration to an
appreciation of th e nature of man's intellectual passivity
which ex p la in s the fact th a t the human spirit must exist
united with a body, which we have just seen explained in terms

3 Ibid., p. 45.
4 I b i d . . p. 60.
^ Ibid.. p. 63.
6 Ibid., p. 64.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

56
of the finality of creation in general.
Passivity, he notes, can have no place in the Absolute
Simplicity of Divinity.

Being nearer to Divinity, the angelic

separate substances are always in actual possession of the
intelligible species connatural to them.

"In contrast, the

human intellect is the lowest member of the intellectual hier7
archy", furthest removed from the Pure Act of the First
Intellect, and consequently in a greater state of potentiality
or passivity.

U n like th e angelic separate substance, the

human intellect is, at conception, devoid of intelligible
forms,

8

and must look to sensible things for these intelli

gible forms which it receives from sensible things but not in
a totally passive way.

For, by its exercise of the matter

immersed external and internal sense powers, the soul provides
itself with a phantasm from which it may abstract the intelli
gible species by the illuminating light of the agent intellect.
Since the human intellect is in such a state of passivity, and
must look to the lower order of sensible things, it is only
fitting that the human principle of intellection should exist
as the form of the body.
Further considerations on the union of soul and body,
be found in Rev. John F« McCormick's The Durden of the
7 Ibid.. p. 67.

9

p' 13.
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Body

9

wherein he discusses the Thom istic answer to the question

of whether charity can be had in its perfection in this life.^^
The problem arises because St.Thomas assigns as one reason why
the soul cannot rise to the

vision of the Divine Light in its

essence, that the body is a burden to the soul. Fr. McCormick
pursues the matter to point out that St.Thomas is referring to
the body as a burden not by reason of the necessary care of the
body, nor by reason of the soul's preoccupation with temporal
things for the sake of the body, nor does it seem to have refer
ence to sin, but rather by reason of the body's corruptibility
which keeps the soul from r is in g to the vision of the Divine
Light in i t s essence,

of which impediment man cannot rid him

self in this present life, Fr. McCormick goes on to point out,
with reference to several passages, that St.Thomas is insistent
that the union of the human soul with the body is not disadvan
tageous to th e soul.

Rather, the union is natural to the soul

both because of the argument from the completion of the species^
and the argument of the soul's need in knowing, to turn to
phantasms which cannot be had except by means of the body.

12

9

John F. McCormick, "The Burden of the Body", The New
Sc..hol.a.st.ici.«. XII (1938), 392 - 400.
St.Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae. IV, "De Veritate" (London, I 9 OO), q. 2, a. 10.
m o r a . p, 33.
Supra. pp. 33 - 34.
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At the close of the a r t i c l e , FrwMcCoriaick speaks of
the intellectual light as being Immaterial (so too is the
i n t e l l i g i b l e o b je c t) - the need for freedom from matter on
the sid e o f the knower and the known.

He goes on to note that

"nearness to matter i s a d im in ish in g of light in the intellect
11
and in th e intelligible form ",
and that consequently "the
intellectual l i g h t poured into a soul u n ite d w ith a body is
dimmed by the material body to which the soul is conjoined."

14

He continues, " th e re fo re to th e fe e b le r lig h t of his intellect
there corresponds f o r man the shaded i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of the
"15
forms of m a te ria l th in g s , h is proportioned objects of thought.
T h e re fo re , it is n a tu ra l fo r man's soul to have an asoectum ad
inferiora. and so the body, rather than being an impediment is
an Indispensable a id to mental growth.
It is to be noted that both these a r t ic le s closed with
references to the agent intellect.

In connection with the

agent i n t e l l e c t , Fr. McCormick brings up a perplexing problem
in another article, ûuaestiones Disputandae.

That problem
17
is discussed in Anton C. F e g is ' In Umbra Intelligentiae
13

g uora. p. 30;

McCormick, op-cit.. p. 400.

IbifL.
IS Ibid.
John F, McCormick, "Quaestiones Disputandae", The New
S.cholastic.ism. XIII, (1939), 368 - 374.
^7 Anton C. Pegis, "In Umbra Intelligentiae", The New
Scholasticism. XIV (1940), 146 - 180.
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whereisi he states it am being the difficulty in seeing*
(a) how the soul can have a way of operating, and
therefore of being, when separated from the body,
and (b) how, even in the body, the agent intellect
can have a function which is not entirely limited
to illumining the phantasms in the imagination. 18
In other words, after death's separation of soul and
body, does the agent intellect cease to have any utility in
the separated soul, "i.e., at precisely the time when the
reason for its existence and the condition of its activity no
longer exist."^9

A# Pr.McCormick pointed out, St.Thomas'

texts seem to indicate that the agent intellect has but the one
function of illuminating the phantasm, and would then seem to
have no utility in the separated soul.

Dr. Pegis notes that

"the Aristotelianism which St.Thomas made the historical
20
cornerstone of his own thought"
has led us into this trap.
While falling back on Plato would help in finding a solution,
that avenue is closed to us, since Plato's efficient causality
21
of the mover-moved relationship is untenable.
Dr. Pegis goes on to show that the soul must be form
as well as substance.

Furthermore, the union of soul and body

must be a natural one, a naturalness which is discovered in
the nature and articulation of human knowledge itself. Therein
Ibid.. p. 147.
19 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. ISO.
££* âBBEâ, P- 27.
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we discover the "humbleness" of the origin of human knowledge
and the imperfection of the agent from which it proceeds.
D r. Pegis continues in stating that perhaps the
answer to the problem at hand will be resolved in a considera
tion of the significance and the consequences, as well as the
metaphysical origins; of St.Thomas' tests "Ratiocinatur homo
discurrendo e t inquirendo lumine rational! per continuum et
tempus obumbrato, ex hoc quod cognitionem a sensu et imagine
s c c ip it..." * *
He goes on to note that man is situated in nobility,
in the hierarchy of being, above the brute animal but also
below the angel, As such, man has a lesser degree of intel
lectuality than the angel, varying by reason of the lesser
universality o f th e p r in c ip le o f knowledge and hence his in
tellect requires a knowledge of "the natures of singulars
through singular sp ecies",

Giving closer consideration to the

d iffe re n c e s , he notes*
(a) the soul i s made for union with the body, the angel
not; (b) th e soul is rational, the angel is Intellect;
(e) the angel has an intellect that is receptive only
of what i s above it, receiving illumination from above,
whether from God or from another angel, while the human
soul has an intellect that i s receptive of both what is
above it and below it, for the human soul is illumined
and also receives knowledge from phantasms; (d) the
angel has an immutable vertibility, because it clings
immutably to the good or the e v i l to which it has once
22 P eg is, OP. cit., p. 157» S t . Thomas Aquinas, "In I I
Sententiarum Petri Lombardi", Ooera Omnia (New York, 1948),
d.III, Q.l, a . 2, - in the l a t t e r work we find intellectuali
in s tea d of ratlonali.
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turned through its own election, while man has a mutable
vertibility, because he can go from good to evil, and
the reverse} (e) the angel expresses himself through
certain intellectual signs without the vehicle of
physical sound, while man speaks through the expression
of sound. 23
Dr. Pegis places great stress on the fact of the soul's
imperfection as an intellectual substance, the reason for
fin d in g within the soul's essence infra-intellectual powers. On
a subsequent page, "intellectual light belongs to the soul by
the very fact that it p a r tic ip a te s in an intellectual nature
To see these differences "is to see, in a way, the relation of
the light of the agent i n t e l l e c t towards intelligere and
abstrahere.

"

Note the assig n atio n of two functions to the

agent intellect - the abstraction of the intelligible species
and the illumination of the intelligible species abstracted.
The light of man's agent Intellect is not sufficient
26
for a distinct knowledge of th in g s .
The intellectual light
which exists in man for knowing (intelligere), and in which
the soul shares, is a diminished light;

it suffers from a

d e b i l i t a s , a weakness whereby it does not actually contain the
d eterm in atio n s of the th in g s known by man who, being intellec
tually without actual specification, must turn to the realm of
23

Pegis, on. cit.. pp. 161 - 162; A f . St.Thomas Aquinas,
U R , b i t . (In IISententiarum), d.III, q.l, a.6.
24 Pegis, op.cit.. p. 164.
Ibid.
2^
St.Thomas Aquinas, on.cit. (In II Sententiarum).
d . I I I , q.3, a.3, ad.l, and a.4 .
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material substances - hence the need for abstraction
(abstrahere),
The writer confesses that Dr. Pegis’ conclusion is
rather vague.

However, i t would seem that he does conclude

th a t the agent i n t e l l e c t has a function of Illumination over
and above the function of a b s tra c tio n .

In closing, Dr.Pegis

s ta te s th a t "the intellectual light e x is ts by nature as the
means of knowing whether in God or in the angel or in man."
This statement would seem to leave very little doubt that
D r . Pegis does reach t h is con clusion , for he would scarcely
assign to God’ s or the a n g e l’ s intellect the function of
abstraction.
It is the w r i t e r ’ s opinion that the agent intellect
in the separated soul can have the utility of illumination
though not o f a b s tra c tio n .

In support of this conclusion,

the following passage is offered:
. . .o p e ra tic intellectu® agentis e t possibilis reepieit
phantasmata secundum quod est anima corpori unita; sed
cum e r i t anima a corpore separata, per intellectum
possibilim recipiet species effluentes a substantife
superioribus, et per intellectum agentem habebit
virtutem ad intelligendum. 28

27 P egis, jU L u J è ü ', P" 180.
28
St.Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae. II, "Do
Anima" (London, 1897), IS, ad 9.
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